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deep and thorough study. There are hints in the second edition (*e. g.*, p. 168) that Sir F. Pollock tends to become more idealist in his own way of looking at things ; but he retains his peculiar irritation against "transcendentalists," and he still says that he has not "the transcendental faculty." Perhaps he uses the word "transcendental" in some esoteric sense.

In the second edition there are several misprints, some of which will be puzzling to readers who have not access to the older volume. The most considerable is that on p. 148, where, at the beginning of line 16, the words "except for the higher geometry" have to be supplied ; and on p. 221, line 9 from foot, "pleasure and" should be read before "pain." Others I had noted are sufficiently obvious not to require special mention.

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FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD : THE APPEAL TO BIOLOGY OR EVOLUTION FOR HUMAN GUIDANCE. By Robert Mackintosh, B.D. (Edin.), M.A., D.D. (Glasg.), Professor at Lancashire Independent College ; Author of "Christ and the Jewish Law," etc, London ; Macmillan & Co., Limited ; New York : The Macmillan Company, 1899. Pp. xxii., 287.

The author tells us in his preface that this work had its proximate origin in the teaching of sociology to a class in Lancashire College, a college where students are prepared for the Congregationalist ministry. In one year essays were prescribed on topics suggested by Mr. Benjamin Kidd's "Social Evolution ;" while the seniors of the next year attended lectures covering rather more ground. The origin and primary purpose of the author's criticism of "the appeal to biology for human guidance" explain a good deal in the merits and defects of the volume. For persons likely to fall victims to the dogmatic exaggerations of Mr. Benjamin Kidd or the facile metaphors of the late Henry Drummond the book may be thoroughly recommended. As a philosophical, or even as an historical, study of the relations between biology and sociology, Mr. Mackintosh's work is somewhat unsatisfactory, though it contains a number of interesting and suggestive criticisms. We are warned, near the outset, that what is assumed in the following essay is "the trustworthiness of the moral consciousness or the reality of the

distinction between right and wrong. This test will not be formally set aside, except by a few wild thinkers ; but it may be objected that assumptions ought to be vindicated, ought to be justified. Very true ; our test needs justification by philosophy, and we believe that philosophy can do the necessary work, but not here. We cannot incorporate *en passant* a body of metaphysical prolegomena to ethics. We must be allowed to let our point of view stand as an assumption." But what *is* the point of view? "The reality of the distinction between right and wrong" is certainly accepted by all except a few "wild thinkers." But Mr. Mackintosh seems by his "or" to identify this reality with "the trustworthiness of the moral consciousness," and that in some extreme intuitionist sense. In criticising Professor S. Alexander's attempt to explain historically the evolution of our moral ideas, Mr. Mackintosh charges Professor Alexander with maintaining a theory of progress "which sets morality at defiance" (p. 128). "Intuitionism," we are told, in one of the few sentences where Mr. Mackintosh reveals his own point of view explicitly, "holds that the good, like other primary elements of consciousness, cannot be decomposed, and neither can nor need be defined" (p. 129). Now to an intuitionist of this type any attempt to explain the historical evolution of moral ideas is necessarily impossible ; and philosophical discussion is unprofitable with a critic who simply falls back upon the infallible Pope in his own breast and tells us, without any effort at proof, that "Progress by struggle—*this* morality thrusting down *that* morality and reigning in its stead—is not exhibited in the facts of history to any one who can look ever so little below the surface" (p. 136). Mr. Mackintosh might surely have allowed us to share in his superior power of seeing underground by giving at least some illustration of the unity amid difference in moral progress. Towards the close of the volume we are told that people will come to see that biology—or more particularly the theory of evolution—gives no guide to conduct, and that, "when this is more generally recognized, we shall see a return of men's minds to the rejected authorities. Religion, conscience, philosophy, even intuitionism, they will all come back, 'trooping all together.'" The four rejected authorities here named do not seem quite symmetrical in character. Does Mr. Mackintosh mean that "intuitionism," *i. e.*, a particular philo-

sophical (or unphilosophical) theory, is an "authority" in the same sense as conscience or religion? And when he talks of religion, he might explain how all the different religions of the world constitute one authority.

There is, moreover, in this passage the primary assumption, which runs through the whole volume, that every attempt to give an historical account of the origin of moral ideas necessarily conflicts with the authority of moral ideas for the individual conscience, and that the interests of practical morality somehow demand the discomfiture of Darwin. Is this not just a revival of the old pulpit attitude towards every science in succession?

Mr. Mackintosh, indeed, admits the theory of natural selection (with an inclination to minimize it) in biology, but affirms that it cannot be applied in sociology or morals (p. 162). Now, it seems to me, that, if natural selection be once admitted in biology (and I cannot see how any one who has ever watched a neglected garden can deny it), it must be admitted in sociology; for, what ever else they may be, men are animal organisms with a tendency to increase beyond the means of subsistence. And the question is not, whether natural selection can apply in sociology, but with what differences and modifications it must apply to the more complicated sphere. By the application of natural selection to morals, Mr. Mackintosh seems to mean the application of a scientific theory to the *practical* guidance of conduct.

Now these two problems—(1) with what differences does the law of natural selection apply to human society and moral institutions and ideas? and (2) what practical consequences follow from its acceptance?—have occupied me a good deal; and I have published a few contributions to the discussion of them, to some of which (*viz.*, the three essays included in a little volume called "Darwinism and Politics") Mr. Mackintosh devotes a few criticisms. I did not know, when I undertook to review his book, that any of my own writings were criticised; and I must ask the readers of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS to excuse the appearance of disproportion, if I say something about Mr. Mackintosh's brief reference to my attempt to deal with these problems instead of discussing directly his more elaborate criticisms of the evolutionary leaders—Comte, Spencer, Darwin, Mr. Leslie Stephen, etc. I know that Mr. Mackintosh has misunderstood and unconsciously misrepresented my own views,

and I therefore feel the more confirmed in my opinion that he has misunderstood to a great extent the views of others.

Mr. Mackintosh says (p. 76) that I seem "quite unwarranted in explaining Spencer's *laissez faire* individualism by his bigoted attachment to the doctrine of natural selection by struggle." My warrant will be found in many passages in "The Man *versus* the State," *e. g.*, where Mr. Spencer speaks of the beneficent working of the survival of the fittest which foolish social reformers are attempting to neutralize. In "Darwinism and Politics" (second or any later edition) p. 9, I referred expressly to the two essays of Spencer's in which such expressions will be found. At the same time I should quite agree with Mr. Mackintosh that Mr. Spencer's conception of evolution is to a great extent unaffected by, and independent of, the theory of natural selection. And I think he makes a very acute remark, when he says that "Spencer is perhaps the least thoroughly biological of all the evolutionary thinkers, whether moralists or sociologists, whom we shall have to pass in review" (p. 61), and when he points out that the famous metaphor of the social organism is only "an ornamental excrescence on Spencer's teaching, not an essential or even a significant part" (p. 94). I have tried to show at some length elsewhere that Mr. Spencer's *laissez faire* individualism is really a survival from old-fashioned Radicalism, and has (as Mr. Mackintosh recognizes, p. 90) more affinity with intuitionism than with the evolution theory. But Mr. Spencer undoubtedly *thinks* that his political theories are based upon his biological conceptions.

Mr. Mackintosh (pp. 122, 123) summarizes the bearing of my essay on "Darwinism and Politics" as follows: "Whatever presumptions are established by a Darwinian view of the origin of man, there is no ground for believing that social progress necessarily implies struggle; reason has come in to change all things." Then he summarizes the two other essays in the volume as follows: "The analysis of evolution by Darwinism is absolutely trustworthy, and may assuredly be extended to human society *mutatis mutandis*." "This implies, he proceeds, that reason has made only minute changes. [Where did he find me saying that?] Yet the first essay teaches that reason has . . . suspended the necessity for struggle." Now I never said that reason can change "all things," nor that reason can suspend all

necessity for struggle or eliminate struggle completely. My whole point was to show that natural selection in social evolution is not necessarily of the same simple kind (working by the death of the unsuccessful) as in the purely biological sphere, and that in all human societies artificial selection (wise or unwise) co-operates with, and sometimes counteracts, natural selection. My phrase "*mutandis mutandis*," which Mr. Mackintosh meets with a mark of exclamation and a reference to Wallenstein's horse (p. 260), was carefully, though briefly, explained by me in "Darwinism and Politics" (pp. 139-141). When Mr. Mackintosh, on p. 263, says that "reason is the fulfilment (as well as the transformation) of nature," he says precisely what I meant to say; though, in criticising me, he speaks as if a "transformation" could not possibly be a "fulfilment;" whereas I have tried to show that natural selection is simply the dialectic movement of reason as it appears in the merely biological sphere. Now it is a perfectly fair criticism to object to the *phrase* "struggle between ideals" as not "a struggle of the Darwinian order" (p. 134; cf. Professor Lloyds Morgan's objections to Professor Alexander and myself because we confuse natural selection and conscious choice, "Habit and Instinct," pp. 335 note, 342 note); but it is a complete misunderstanding of Darwin and of the whole theory of natural selection to suppose that "struggle for existence" necessarily means fighting in the literal sense. "If the child of vicious or criminal or heartless parents is neglected and dies, while the child of honest, pure, and affectionate parents survives, there is no struggle" (pp. 169, 170). There is, *in Darwin's sense*: just as when a sturdy, well-nourished plant survives where a delicate plant, or one attacked by parasites, succumbs. Two rival doctors are struggling for existence, though they may not shoot each other, but be on perfectly friendly terms. As, I think, Mr. Mackintosh himself cleverly says somewhere [I cannot find the passage again]: "Nowadays we do not cut throats; we cut prices." Commercial competition is the struggle for existence in Darwin's sense much more truly than the struggle of the battle-field. Now it seems to me a perfectly legitimate extension of the terms "struggle for existence" and "natural selection" to apply them to the competition between ideas and ideals which goes on whenever we are debating and discussing or even thinking out a problem in solitude, though

of course we must recognize the difference introduced by any transition from the unconscious struggle of "nature" to the more or less conscious struggles of mind. But the gap between "Nature" and "Reason" is not absolute, unless we adopt the strange dualism of Huxley's lecture on "Evolution and Ethics," in criticising which Mr. Mackintosh writes: "A fuller answer to Huxley's perplexities regarding the moral bearings of evolution is to be found in a better view of reason. Morality is a new thing in the creation with the advent of rational man, yet not wholly new. It is the *transformation* and perfecting of animal ethics, not the simple inversion of the cosmic process" (p. 141). This is an excellent piece of criticism, but it seems inconsistent with Mr. Mackintosh's "intuitionalist" rejection of the attempts to reconcile idealism with evolutionary ethics.\*

I have left many things in Mr. Mackintosh's book untouched. As we might expect from his "Intuitionism," he proclaims himself "an impenitent free-willer" (p. 49) without defining "free-will;" and in one place (p. 175) he recognizes, like Professor W. James, that "No contingency in nature, would imply, No free-will in man!" Yet, on p. 264, in summing up the results obtained from his criticism of naturalistic schemes, he says, "The universe will be revealed on deeper and fuller study as a system, not a chance aggregation of disconnected parts, but a *cosmos*. Chaos and chance will be banished to the region of bad dreams" (p. 264). What, then, will become of the free-will which depends upon contingency in nature? On p. 182, Mr. Mackintosh says that Darwin treated variations as casual, "almost as if uncaused." Now Darwin and all his more careful followers have always made it quite clear that, when they speak of "accidental" or "spontaneous" variations, they mean simply variations of which as yet we do not know the causes. Like some other critics or minimizers of Darwinism, Mr. Mackintosh lays stress on the merely negative character of natural selection, and compares "our modern evolutionists" (*whom?*) to a pig-driver who should say he got his pigs to market by heading them off at the cross-roads, "as if barricading the wrong roads not

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\* Those who care to follow out my line of criticism at greater length may refer to an article on "Social Evolution," in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, January, 1896, or to my essay on "Darwin and Hegel."

only kept the pigs from straying, but actually taught them for the first time to walk" (p. 188). Now, just as every pig-driver knows that pigs do move and that the problem is to get them to move the way you wish, so every evolutionist knows that organisms vary (look at the flowers on the same plant, the puppies of the same litter!); but the problem for Darwin was how to explain the relative fixity of species, given the facts of variation and heredity; and the problem for the sociologist is how to explain the diversity among the social and moral institutions of mankind, given the tendency to strike out new lines ("invention") and the tendency to follow existing usage ("imitation"). And to these problems natural selection—"weeding out"—seems a very good answer, though it most certainly leaves the *facts* of variation and heredity unexplained.

Any detailed account, however, of the various ways in which the law of natural selection comes to be modified, complicated, or restricted by the exercise of more or less conscious choice, would occupy a good deal of space, and cannot be attempted here.

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A MANUAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. By G. F. Stout, M.A., LL.D. (The University Tutorial Series). University Correspondence College Press: London, W. B. Clive; New York, Hinds & Noble. 1899. Pp. xvi., 643.

The Editor of *Mind* and the author of the well known "Analytic Psychology" (London, 1896) here presents a text book of Psychology, intended for beginners, and specially adjusted to the purpose of preparing students for examinations, yet of solid interest to properly prepared readers of all grades. The general point of view of the author is known from his previous work. The method of this book has also the features for which his former publications have prepared us. A wide acquaintance with the literature of Experimental Psychology, and a recognition of the most permanently valuable tendencies of the older English Psychology, a frequent use of anthropological illustrations of mental processes, and a strong interest in the philosophical bearings of the problems of Psychology, all appear as auxiliaries to the main special interest that the author takes in the problems of mental development. This main interest lies in a